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Re: Matthew Wayne Miller v. State, No. 940718-CA
Utah R. App. P. 24(i) Supplemental Authority Letter
Dear Ms. Branch:
Pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, I
am citing Jon Bryan Monson v. Scott Carver, No. 950199 (Utah
December 6, 1996) , as supplemental authority in support of Point
IIB-IID, pp. 13-15 of the State's brief in Miller v. State. The
State also relies on the Monson case to support its oral argument
reply to petitioner's reply brief argument concerning whether the
Board has constitutional and statutory authority to impose
restitution as a condition of early release. I have attached a
copy of Monson. This Case is currently under submission.
I appreciate your prompt distribution of this letter to the
Court
Sincerely,

THOMAS B. BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
nn-

n\ Thomas Bowen

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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Utah Board of Pardons and
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The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki
Attorneys:

J. Thomas Bowen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Norman E. Plate, Asst.
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ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice;
Jon Bryan Monson appeals from the district court's
denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he
alleged that the Board of Pardons and Parole PBoard") committed
various constitutional violations in setting his parole date and
ordering him to pay restitution as a condition of parole. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
The facts leading up to this appeal are as follows: On
November 18, 1985, Monson pleaded guilty to the murder of a coworker, Phillip W. Kerby. Monson and Kerby had been involved in
various thefts from their employer, and Monson shot Kerby in the
back and chest to prevent him from disclosing information
concerning the thefts. Monson then buried Kerby's body under a
pile of rocks near Oakley, Utah. Kerby's parents reported him
missing to police on October 3, 1984. His body was not found
until May 5, 1985, when Monson's brother discovered it under the
pile of rocks. Thereafter, Monson readily admitted his guilt and
cooperated with law enforcement officers.

Monson was initially charged with first degree murder,
but the charge was reduced to second degree murder pursuant to a
plea agreement. On November 18f 1985, upon the entry of Monson's
guilty plea, the trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate
term of five years to life for the second degree murder
conviction and enhanced Monson's sentence by one year because he
used a firearm in the commission of the murder, pursuant to
section 76-3-203(1) of the Utah Code. The trial court also
recommended that Monson receive psychological and substance abuse
counseling and treatment while at the Utah State Prison. Shortly
after entering prison, Monson was transferred to Utah State
Hospital, where he remained until the end of 1992 as a
participant in the public offenders program.
On November 19, 1986, the Board held Monson's initial
parole grant hearing. The Board made no parole decision at the
initial hearing but ordered a rehearing to be held in November of
1993, which the Board later rescheduled for November of 1992. At
the November 1992 rehearing, Kerby's father was permitted to
testify, and he questioned whether justice was served by allowing
Monson to serve time at the state hospital rather than in prison.
This sentiment was echoed by the Board member who conducted the
rehearing, although he also indicated that Monson had made
*commendable progress" at the hospital, had obtained his high
school diploma and associate degree, was working toward a
journeyman plumber's license, and that hospital personnel felt
that he had ^reached a maximum" and was '"well rehabilitated.''
Shortly after the rehearing, the Board issued a formal order
granting Monson a parole date of November 23, 1999, and imposing
four special parole conditions which required that Monson
(i) submit to random drug testing, (ii) have no contact with
Kerby's family, (iii} not consume or possess any alcohol, and
(iv) pay restitution in an amount to be determined.
On January 19, 1993, Monson filed a pro se petition in
the district court alleging that the Board had subjected him to
cruel and unusual punishment and double jeopardy by refusing to
consider and count the nearly seven years that he had spent at
Utah State Hospital as time served toward his sentence. Monson
later obtained the services of an attorney who, with leave of
court and pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, filed an
amended petition on November 3, 1993. The amended petition
alleged that the Board (i) had exceeded its constitutional
authority in ordering restitution/ (ii) lacked statutory
authority to order restitution at the time Monson's sentence was
imposed, and thus its order violated the ex post facto
prohibitions of the Utah and federal constitutions; (iii) failed
to comply with certain procedural requirements when it ordered
restitution; (iv) abused its discretion because its order of
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restitution was for something other than pecuniary damages;
(v) subjected Monson to double jeopardy by ordering restitution;
(vi) was imprisoning Monson effectively for failure to pay a debt
in violation of article I, section 16 of the Utah Constitution;
(vii) inflicted cruel and unusual punishment and violated due
process by exceeding the Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines
("Guidelines") in setting a parole date for Monson; and
(viii) did not provide Monson with adequate due process because
it failed to give a detailed written rationale for departing from
the Guidelines^ failed to allow Monson to have an attorney at the
1992 rehearing and present witnesses on his behalf/ failed to
credit Monson with precommitment time served in jail and time
spent at Utah State Hospital/ and failed to provide an adequate
rationale for his parole date. The Board answered and moved to
dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted or, alternatively/ for judgment on the
pleadings/ pursuant to rules 12(b)(6) and 12{c)/ respectively/ of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court held a hearing on the Board's
motions on February 15/ 1994. In its subsequent orderr the court
ruled that there was no right tc parole under Utah law and that
the trial court had imposed a valid indeterminate sentence upon
Monson. Accordingly/ the court reasoned/ unless the Board in its
unfettered discretion granted Monson a parole date# his term
would not expire until his death. Because Monson was free to
accept or reject any parole offer and its attendant terms and
conditions, Mthe Board cannot make [Monson'sj sentence any more
harsh than that already imposed by the court at sentencing," so
that the conditions of parole actually imposed were not
"punishment" forbidden by the ex post facto or double jeopardy
clauses of the Utah and federal constitutions. Specifically/ the
court ruled that the Board is free to set any parole conditions
that are legitimately related to an inmate's underlying crime,
including the restitution ordered in Monson1s case. The court
then ruled that a grant of parole after serving fourteen1 years
of a life sentence was not so harsh as to violate the cruel and
unusual punishment clauses of the Utah and United States
Constitutions, Accordingly, the court dismissed all of Monson's
claims except those related to the Board's departure from the
Guidelines. As to those claims, the court deferred making a
decision until after an evidentiary hearing at which Monson would
be required to prove that he actually relied on the Guidelines
when he entered his guilty plea.

1

The district court's order mistakenly referred to a
sixteen-year term of incarceration. In fact, the Board's order
requires Monson to serve only fourteen years.
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The evidentiary hearing was subsequently held on
December 22, 1994. Monson and his mother both testified that
Monson's trial attorney had indicated that Monson would actually
serve about six to seven years based on the Guidelines if he
pleaded guilty to second degree murder. Monson's trial attorney
testified that while he conveyed his opinion that Monson would
serve only seven to eight years, he had no personal knowledge of
the Guidelines at that time and had simply given an estimate
based on his general knowledge. The court then ruled that Monson
had failed to demonstrate that he actually relied on the
Guidelines when he entered his plea. Accordingly, the district
court dismissed the remainder of Monson's claims.
Monson now appeals the district court's rejection of
the claims he raised in his petition. Specifically, he contends
that (i) Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment; (ii) the Board lacks constitutional
authority to order restitution; (iii) the Board's order of
restitution violates constitutional and statutory prohibitions
against ex post facto laws and subjected Monson to double
jeopardy; (iv) the Board failed to follow proper procedures in
ordering restitution; and (v) the Board violated Monson's due
process rights at the 1992 rehearing by denying him legal
counsel, not allowing witnesses to testify on his behalf, and
failing to give an adequate rationale for its parole decision.
Monson also raises several additional claims which were
not included in his original or amended petition and which we do
not address today. These additional claims are that the Board
(i) failed to provide Monson with access to his Board file;2

2

Although Monson filed his amended petition prior to the
issuance of our decision in Labrum v. State Board of Pardons, 870
P.2d 902 (Utah 1993), he waited until after Labrum to request
access to his file and did so, not by amending his petition, but
by asking the district court for an order compelling the Board to
release his file. On appeal, he does not challenge the district
court's denial of that motion but contends that Labrum dictates
that he should have received his file prior to the November 1992
rehearing. However, Monson did not complain of the lack of
access to his file in his original or amended petition, which
were both filed prior to the Labrum decision. Thus, his
subsequent request for his file does not qualify for the
retroactive relief announced in Labrum, which was specifically
limited to %*a claim [then] pending in the district court or on
appeal before this court . • . challenging original parole grant
hearing procedures on due process grounds." Id. at 914. In
(Footnote continued on the next page.)
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(ii) violated the compulsory process clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by failing to allow
Monson to have witnesses testify on his behalf; (iii) violated
the speedy trial clause3 and rule 22 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure by delaying Monson's Sentencing" for some
seven years after the entry of his guilty plea; (iv) is bound by
the alleged representations of individuals within the criminal
justice system that if Monson participated in the public
offenders program, he would be paroled shortly after successfully
completing the program; and (v) offends the separation of powers
principles contained in article V, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution because it makes sentencing decisions which are
subject to limited and inadequate appellate review under rule 65B
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure• We decline to address
these additional claims because of our general rule that ^issues
not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on
appeal." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994), This
rule applies to all claims, including constitutional questions,
unless the petitioner demonstrates that "plain error" occurred or
^exceptional circumstances" exist. Id. Monson has not attempted
to demonstrate the applicability of either exception, and we
therefore do not reach the claims that he failed to raise in his
original or amended petition and that were not addressed by the
district court.
Returning to the claims that Monson properly raises on
appeal, we first state the relevant standard of review. *When
reviewing an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, we accord no deference to the conclusions of law
that underlie the dismissal. They are reviewed for correctness."
Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1994); accord Smith v.
Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 790 (Utah 1990). In addition, "while *we
must review the fairness of the process by which the Board
undertakes its sentencing function, • . . we do not sit as a
panel of review on the result.'" Neel, 886 P.2d at 1100 (quoting
Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994)).

2

(Footnote continued.)
short, because Monson's request for his file was not pending
before Labrum was issued but was raised only after that time, he
is not entitled to the benefit of our decision in Labrum.
3

Monson does not specify whether this claim is based on the
speedy trial clause of the United States Constitution, see U.S.
Const, amend. VI, or of the Utah Constitution, see Utah Const,
art. I, § 12. Because we do not address this argument, we need
not resolve this point.

5
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We first address Monson's claim that Utah's
indeterminate sentencing scheme constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.4 Monson does not contend that the trial
court erred in imposing an indeterminate sentence, but rather
that the Board's unfettered discretion may be used to set release
dates which allow for punishment disproportionate to the severity
of the offense committed. He claims that indeterminate
sentencing as implemented by the Board subjects prisoners to
^mentally" cruel and unusual punishment because (i) they may not
be informed of the actual amount of time they must serve for long
periods of time; (ii) it allows the Board to rely on
unadjudicated allegations of wrongdoing and ex parte
communications in determining the length of incarceration; and
(iii) it gives the Board unfettered discretion in determining
periods of incarceration despite the minimum terms suggested by
the Guidelines. We read these points essentially as claiming
that when the Board's discretion is not bounded by the
Guidelines, the terms of incarceration it imposes may be
excessive. Similarly, Monson argues that his term of fourteen
years of confinement, as ordered by the Board, is
unconstitutionally excessive because it exceeds the six-year term
suggested by the Guidelines.
We reject these contentions insofar as they are
premised on the concept that the Guidelines create a liberty
interest or an ^expectation of release" such that the Board's
departure from them could amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
We have previously said that "any ^expectation of release'
derived from the [Guidelines is at best tenuous" because they do
not have the force and effect of law. Preece v. House, 886 P.2d
508, 511 (Utah 1994) (citing Labrum v. State Bd. of Pardons, 870
P.2d 902, 908 (Utah 1993)); see also Foote v. Utah Bd. of
Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). In this case, as is
typical, Monson received an indeterminate sentence of six years
to life. The Board, in exercising its discretion, could have
denied Monson any parole date, with the consequence that he would
have had to serve the maximum term of life in prison. If we were
to credit Monson's argument that the Board's departure from the

4

Monson also asserted in his brief that Utah's sentencing
scheme violates due process protections contained in the Utah
Constitution. However, Monson's brief contains no argument
specific to this claim and fails to cite to any ^authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied upon" in violation of
rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Accordingly, we do not address this issue. Walker v. U.S.
General, Inc., 916 P.2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996).
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Guidelines in his and other cases amounts to the imposition of an
excessive punishment/ we would/ in effect/ transform Utah's
indeterminate sentencing scheme into a scheme of determinate
sentences fixed by the Guidelines. This we refuse to do. *lS]o
long as the period of incarceration decided upon by the board of
pardons falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range,
. . . then that decision, absent unusual circumstances, cannot be
arbitrary and capricious." Preece/ 886 P.2d at 512. Likewise,
we do not think that the Board's decision to permit an inmate to
serve less than the maximum term of his or her sentence can
constitute cruel and unusual punishment/ absent a showing that a
particular parole decision results in a term of incarceration
that is grossly excessive/ as we define that term below. We
therefore reject Monson's claims as to the Board's parole
decisions generally.
We now address Monson's claim that his own term of
fourteen years is unconstitutionally excessive. We reject this
claim because Monson has not made the requisite showing to
support it. When an inmate claims that his or her parole date
decision imposes an excessive punishment/ the initiate's "challenge
must meet the test for cruel and unusual punishment in specific
applications: ^whether the sentence imposed in proportion to the
offense committed is such as to shock the moral sense of all
reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the
circumstances.'" State v. Russell/ 791 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1990)
(quoting State v. Bastian, 765 P.2d 902, 904 (Utah 1988)).
Because the Guidelines do not have the force and effect of law,
mere comparison of a term set by a parole decision to the minimum
term suggested by the Guidelines is insufficient to meet this
test. Rather, an inmate must demonstrate that his or her parole
decision results in an actual sentence that is disproportionate
by reference to the following three factors: *(i) the gravity of
the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions." State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah
1986) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)). Although
both below and on appeal Monson set forth these factors and
asserted that terms of imprisonment imposed by the Board are
generally disproportionate in light of these factors/ he
presented no evidence to support this assertion. We have
previously refused to address claims under analogous
circumstances, i.e., when an appellant fails to properly cite to
the record, under the justification that xya ^reviewing court is
entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'"
Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline

7
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Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 230-31 (Utah 1995} (quoting State v.
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (additional citation
omitted)). That justification applies with even more force in
the present case because any showing that Monson could make would
critically depend on factual research into terms of imprisonment
for specific offenses in Utah and in other states. It is not
this court's role to conduct factual research on behalf of a
party, and absent that research, we refuse to consider Monson's
claim that his fourteen-year term of incarceration for second
degree murder is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment.
We next address Monson's claims concerning restitution.
First, he contends that the Board lacks constitutional authority
to order restitution as a condition of parole. We disagree. At
the time of Monson's crime, sentencing, and 1992 parole
rehearing, article VII, section 12 of the Utah Constitution
provided in pertinent part:5
Until otherwise provided by law, . . . a
Board of Pardons, • • . upon such conditions
as may be established by the Legislature, may
remit fines and forfeitures, commute
punishments, and grant pardons after
convictions, in all cases except treason and
impeachments, subject to such regulations as
may be provided by law, relative to the
manner of applying for pardons; but no fine
or forfeiture shall be remitted, and no
commutation or pardon granted, except after a
full hearing before the Board, in open
session, after previous notice of the time
and place of such hearing has been given.
The proceedings and decisions of the Board,
with the reasons therefor in each case,
together with the dissent of any member who
may disagree, shall be reduced to writing,
and filed with all papers used upon the

5

We note that a 1992 amendment, which took effect on
January 1, 1993, essentially rewrote article VII, section 12 of
the Utah Constitution. We do not address the text of the 1992
amendment in this opinion because it applies only prospectively
and is therefore not relevant to Monson's claims concerning the
1992 parole rehearing. State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296, 297-98
(Utah 1985) (per curiam) ("A constitutional amendment is to be
given only prospective application, unless the intent to make it
retrospective clearly appears from its terms.")*
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hearing, in the office of such officer as
provided by law.
Utah Const, art. VII, § 12 (1992) (emphasis added). Monson
claims that because the constitution does not specifically permit
the Board to order restitution, it may not do so. Thus, Monson
essentially argues the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius," that is, "the expression of one thing is the exclusion
of another." Black's Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990). We have
endorsed this principle only as an aid to constitutional and
statutory interpretation, not as a rule of law. Cullum v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993). Indeed, we
have recognized that **it is a valuable servant, but a dangerous
master.'" Id. at 924 n.6 (quoting Rio Grande Motor Way, Inc. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 445 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1968) (additional
citation omitted)). Rather, the critical aspect of any
constitutional interpretation is to Mdivin[e] the intent and
purpose of the framers," Society of Separationists v. Whitehead,
870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993), and rules of statutory
interpretation exist only to assist in this determination.
Cullum, 857 P.2d at 924. Specifically, the maxim appropriately
applies "*only where in the natural association of ideas the
contrast between a specific subject matter which is expressed and
one which is not mentioned leads to an inference that the latter
was not intended to be included within the statute."' Id.
(quoting 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 333, at 670 (1953)).
We reject the argument that the language of
article VII, section 12 leads to the inference that the Board may
not order restitution. The constitutional language plainly
states that the Board, "upon such conditions as may be
established by the Legislature, may . . . commute punishments,
and grant pardons after convictions." Utah Const, art. VII, § 12
(1992) (emphasis added). We have held that this language confers
plenary authority on the Board to impose conditions of parole,
even absent legislation specifying particular conditions.
Mansell v. Turner, 384 P.2d 394, 395 (Utah 1963) (upholding
Board's imposition of banishment as condition of parole). We
explained that *lt]he prisoner may reject the conditions and
serve out his term," and we noted that if a condition should be
unconstitutional, the prisoner need not accept it, in which event
%x
there .is no condition, and the sentence would have to be
served." Id. at 395 & n.4. We see no reason to depart from this
interpretation of the constitutional language, and we reject
Monson's suggested interpretation to the contrary. Therefore, we
conclude that the absence of the term ^restitution" from the
constitutional provision setting forth the Board's powers does

9
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net preclude the Board from ordering restitution as a condition
of parole.6
Moreover, in 1985, the legislature established the
statutory authority for the Board to impose restitution as a
condition of parole by amending section 77-27-5 of the Utah Code,
Board of Pardons Amendments, ch. 213, § 1, 1985 Utah Laws 597,
597. That statutory authority provides in pertinent part:
In determining when, where, and under
what conditions offenders serving sentences
may be released upon parole, pardoned, have
restitution ordered, or have their fines and
forfeitures remitted, or their sentences
commuted or terminated, the Board of Pardons
shall consider whether the persons have made
or are prepared to make restitution as
ascertained in accordance with the standards
and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a
condition of any parole, pardon, remission of
fines or forfeitures, or commutation or
termination of sentence.
Id. (emphasis added); accord Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5. Thus,
because the Utah Constitution expressly allows the legislature to
establish conditions of parole and section 77-27-5 of the Code
indicates that the legislature considers restitution to be *a
condition of any parole" which the Board "shall consider," we
reject Monson's argument that the constitution precludes the
Board from ordering restitution. To the contrary, because the
Board's statutory authority became effective on April 29, 1985,
before Monson pleaded guilty and was sentenced, and before the
Board held his 1992 parole rehearing, the Board had express
statutory authority at his parole rehearing to order restitution
as a condition of his parole.
Monson next contends that because the amended version
of section 77-27-5 was not in effect at the time he murdered
Kerby in the fall of 1984, it was applied retroactively in
violation of article I, section 18 of the Utah Constitution and
article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution, both of

6

We also note that article VII, section 12 of the
constitution omits the word ^parole," yet Monson does not claim
that the Board lacks constitutional authority to order parole•
This omission supports our interpretation that the omission of
express language authorizing the Board to order restitution does
not bar the Board from doing so.
No. 950199
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which prohibit ex post facto laws. We disagree. An ex post
facto law is one that %% ^punishes as a crime an act previously
committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more
burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or
which deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available
according to law at the time when the act was committed.'" State
v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 585 (Utah 1983) (quoting Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977) (additional citation omitted)),
cert, denied, 466 U.S. 942 (1984), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). Monson relies on the
second clause of this definition when he argues that the order of
restitution increased his punishment beyond the period of
incarceration ordered by the trial court.
However, the Board's assessment of restitution under
section 77-27-5 as a condition of parole does not increase
Monson's punishment because, under the law in effect at the time
he committed his crime, a trial court could have ordered both
incarceration and restitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.
Thus, Monson had no accrued right to a sentence that excluded
restitution. See Norton, 675 P.2d at 585-86. That the
legislature later conferred the procedural authority on the Board
to order restitution as a condition of parole as part of the
Board's inherent sentencing function, see Labrum, 870 P.2d at
911, does not diminish the fact that the possibility existed at
the time of Monson's crime that he would be ordered to pay
restitution. Norton, 675 P.2d at 585-86. Accordingly, the
amendment of section 77-27-5 did not change the sentencing
alternatives which existed at the time he committed his crime.
See id. at 586. Therefore, application of section 77-27-5 to
Monson does not violate constitutional prohibitions against ex
post facto laws.
Moreover, the Board's order of restitution did not
increase or make more burdensome the sentence imposed by the
trial court. Rather, the Board offered Monson an alternative to
the maximum life term to which he was otherwise subject. It is
analytically impossible for us to place a monetary value on time
spent in prison. Thus, the parole alternative, which combines a
term of fourteen years with the payment of restitution, cannot be
said to exceed the maximum life term imposed by the trial court.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the statute permitting the
Board to order restitution constitutes an ex post facto law which
"makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its
commission*r/ Id. at 585.
For similar reasons, we reject Monson's next
contention, that the Board's order of restitution subjects him to
double jeopardy. The Fifth Amendment of the United States

11
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Constitution provides that no person "shall . . . be subject for
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
The Utah Constitution also prohibits double jeopardy. See Utah
Const, art. I, § 12 (M[N]or shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense."). Although Monson does not
specify which of these provisions he relies upon, his argument is
based solely upon federal cases construing the federal clause,
and we therefore analyze this issue solely as a claim under the
United States Constitution and federal law. See State v. Wood,
868 P.2d 70, 90 n.4 (Utah 1993) (declining to reach state
constitutional double jeopardy claim when appellant failed to
argue for different interpretation under state law).
One of the purposes of the prohibition against double
jeopardy is to protect a defendant against the infliction of
multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Holland, 777
P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1989) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711, 717 (1969)); accord State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 35
(Utah 1987) . Monson contends that subjecting him to both
imprisonment and restitution constitutes multiple punishments.
We disagree because we do not consider the restitution ordered in
this case to be "punishment." In United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435 (1989), the Supreme Court considered "whether and under
what circumstances a civil penalty may constitute 'punishment'
for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis."7 Id. at 436. The
Court held that "a defendant who already has been punished . . .
may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the
extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized
as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." Id. at
448-49 (emphasis added). The sole test to be used in making this
determination requires a court, on a case-by-case basis, to
compare the harm suffered as a result of a defendants conduct
with the size of the civil penalty. Id. at 449-50; see also
United States v. Ursery, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549, 564-66 & n.2 (1996)
(summarizing Halper). If the amount of the penalty is so grossly
excessive that it cannot be fairly characterized as compensatory
7

The Board initially argues that double jeopardy principles
do not apply to Board parole proceedings because they are civil
in nature. It relies on our statement that ^double jeopardy
principles apply only in criminal cases." In re McCune, 717 P.2d
701, 707 (Utah 1986) . However, recent federal case law clarifies
that no ^absolute and irrebuttable rule" exists that a civil
penalty cannot be punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy
analysis. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 442 (1989). We
therefore decline to adopt the criminal/civil distinction urged
by the Board, and to the extent our prior cases suggested that
such a distinction was a dispositive factor in double jeopardy
analysis, we hereby disavow them.
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or remedial, then the penalty can be considered "punishment."
See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-50.
Applying that test in the instant case, it is clear
from the legislative scheme that restitution is not a
^punishment" but a civil penalty whose purpose is entirely
remedial/ i.e., to compensate victims for the harm caused by a
defendant and whose likely intent is to spare victims the time,
expense, and emotional difficulties of separate civil litigation
to recover their damages from the defendant. We briefly
summarize the relevant statutory provisions supporting this
conclusion.
The Board is required to consider restitution in
accordance with the standards and procedures set forth in section
76-3-201 of the Utah Code,8 Utah Code Ann- § 77-27-5(5). We
turn first to that section which defines restitution as "full,
partial/ or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim.''
Id. § 76-3-201(1) (d) . A victim, in turn, is *any person [who]
the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result
of the defendant's criminal activities.'' Id.
§ 76-3-201(1) (e) (i). Lastly, pecuniary damages are
all special damages, but not general damages,
which a person could recover against the
defendant in a civil action arising out of
the facts or events constituting the
defendant's criminal activities and includes
the money equivalent of property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and
losses including earnings and medical
expenses.
Id. § 76-3-201(1)(c) (emphasis added). Plainly, these
definitional provisions limit restitution to that amount which is
necessary to compensate a victim for losses caused by the
defendant. In addition, section 76-3-201.2, which provides that
an order of restitution does not bar a later civil suit against a
defendant and cannot be used as evidence in such a suit,
nonetheless provides that %%the court shall credit any restitution
paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment in favor

8

Section 76-3-201 of the Code has been internally
renumbered since Monsonrs 1992 parole rehearing. For clarity, we
refer in this opinion to subsection numbers as they appear in the
current version of the statute. These substantive provisions are
identical to those which were contained in the 1992 version of
the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1992).
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of the victim in the civil action." Thus, under the statutory
scheme, the damages awarded in a separate civil suit cannot
duplicate the damages a victim receives through court- or Boardordered restitution, thus ensuring that restitution serves only
its compensatory purpose. Finally, the Board is limited to
ordering restitution *Nin an amount not to exceed the pecuniary
damages to the victim or victims of the offense of which the
defendant has been convicted, or the victim of any other criminal
conduct admitted to by the defendant to the sentencing court."
Id. § 77-27-7(2). From the foregoing provisions, it is evident
that restitution, when ordered by the Board, is indistinguishable
from compensatory civil damages, and we therefore do not construe
it as a vpunishment" for double jeopardy purposes.
We now address Monson's last claim pertaining to
restitution, which is that the Board failed to comply with proper
procedures when it ordered restitution. Specifically, Monson
claims that the Board failed to consider the statutory standards
set forth in section 76-3-201 as it is directed to do by section
77-27-5 and that he was denied a hearing on the restitution
issue. The 3oard counters that these issues are not ripe for
appellate review because the Board has not yet determined the
amount of restitution to be ordered and that it may ultimately
determine that no restitution is due, thus rendering the issue
moot.
We first address the standards that the Board must
apply in ordering restitution. Section 77-27-5 of the Code
provides in pertinent part:
In determining when, where, and under what
conditions offenders serving sentences may be
paroled • . • [or] have restitution ordered,
. . . the Board of Pardons and Parole shall
consider whether the persons have made or are
prepared to make restitution as ascertained
in accordance with the standards and
procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a
condition of any parole • • . .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(5) (emphasis added). Section 76-3-201
requires that trial courts take into account certain factors in
determining whether to order complete, partial, or nominal
restitution. These factors are:
(i) the financial resources of the
defendant and the burden that payment of
restitution will impose, with regard to the
other obligations of the defendant;
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(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay
restitution on an installment basis or on
other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the
defendant of the payment of restitution and
the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court
determines make restitution inappropriate,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(c). In addition, section 76-3-201
provides, "When the court determines that restitution is
appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court
shall make the rea'sons for the decision a part of the court
record." Id. § 76-3-201(4)(d)(i)• We agree that the language of
section 77-27-5 mandates that the Board must follow both the
substantive standards of section 76-3-201 and its procedural
requirements. It must not only consider the four statutory
factors when it orders restitution as a condition of parole, but
it must also comply with the same procedural requirements imposed
on a trial court, e.g., it shall make a record of the reasons for
its decision.
The record in this case does not demonstrate that the
Board considered the statutory factors because it does not
contain any explanation of the reasons the Board ordered Monson
to pay restitution. The most likely explanation for this lack is
that the Board had not yet determined the amount of restitution
it would ultimately require. Nonetheless, in issuing its order,
the Board has not met the statutory requirements. As a result,
Monson appropriately sought extraordinary relief. See Preece,
886 P.2d at 511-12. We therefore reject the Board's contention
that this issue is not ripe for review. The appropriate remedy
for the Board's error, however, is not to vacate the order of
restitution, as Monson suggests, but to order the Board to comply
with the statute by giving Monson an explanation of its decision
which demonstrates that it has taken into account the appropriate
statutory factors. Id. at 512. In so doing, the Board will no
doubt determine the amount of restitution to be ordered.9 We

9

In making its determination, the Board may (i) request
that the Department of Corrections investigate and file a written
report on the amount of restitution that is appropriate in light
of the statutory factors, and (ii) hold a hearing on the issue at
which the inmate and the victim(s), after appropriate notice and
access to the investigative report and other materials, may
present evidence. Utah Admin. Code R671-403-2 (1992).
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therefore reverse the district court's decision insofar as it
found that the Board did not err in ordering restitution.
We next address Monson's contention that he was denied
a hearing on the restitution issue. Monson again relies on
section 76-3-201(4) (e), made applicable to the Board by virtue of
section 77-27-5. Section 76-3-201 (4) (e) provides, *If the
defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow
him a full hearing on the issue." We agree that this provision
applies fully to the Board. It requires that after restitution
is ordered and after an inmate objects to the order, the Board
must hold a *full hearing" on the inmate's objections. That did
not occur in this case because Monson did not object to the order
of restitution and did not request that the Board hold a hearing.
Instead, he filed his petition for extraordinary relief in the
district court. We therefore find no error in the Board's
failure to hold a hearing on the restitution issue.10 However,
if the Board later amends its order to specify an amount of
restitution and Monson objects to the imposition, amount, or
distribution of the restitution so ordered, he will then be
entitled to a full hearing on his objection.11
Finally, we turn to Monson's contentions that the Board
violated his due process rights by denying him legal counsel at
the 1992 rehearing, not allowing him to present witnesses, and
failing to give an adequate rationale for its parole decision.
We address these issues in order.
We reject Monson's first claim that the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution guarantees him the effective
assistance of counsel at a parole rehearing. The amendment
provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to . . . have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence." U.S. Const, amend. VI. Monson's argument is premised
on our statements that in setting an original parole date, the

10

Moreover, we do not construe the Board's own regulations
as requiring it to hold a hearing prior to ordering restitution.
The procedure set forth in administrative rule 671-403-2 for a
preorder hearing is clearly discretionary, because it states, *A
restitution hearing may be conducted by a Board panel or hearing
officer." Utah Admin. Code R671-403-2 (1992) (emphasis added).
11

Because a postorder hearing was not held in this case, it
would be premature for us to address the due process protections
that the Board may be required to give an inmate at such a
hearing.
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Board performs a function analogous to that of a trial judge in
jurisdictions that have a determinate sentencing scheme. See,
e.g.,
Labruirw 670 P.2d at 908; Foote, 608 P.2d at 735. He
therefore reasons that he was entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel in reliance on our cases and federal cases
that have suggested or held that a defendant has a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel when a trial court imposes a criminal
sentence. See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 135 (1967);
State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) (^Sentencing is
a critical stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is
entitled to the effective assistance of counsel.").
Our cases, however, have not said that an original
parole grant hearing is identical for all purposes to a
sentencing hearing before the trial court. Rather, we have said,
*'The reality of original release hearings is that they are
analogous to sentencing hearings and require due process to the
extent that the analogy holds." Labrum, 870 P.2d at 908
(emphasis added). In holding that due process requirements based
on article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution may apply to
certain parole proceedings, we necessarily rejected the
categori2ation of parole proceedings as "criminal proceedings" to
which other constitutional rights, including the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, might categorically
attach. Because it is well settled that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is not implicated in noncriminal proceedings,
Neel, 886 P.2d at 1103, we hold that the amendment does not
require the effective assistance of counsel at parole grant
hearings, including the rehearing at issue here. Cf. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-90 (1973) (finding no constitutional
right to counsel in parole revocation proceedings but holding
that due process may require counsel in certain cases).
To the extent that due process guarantees under the
Utah Constitution may apply to Monson's 1992 rehearing,12 he has

12

Although the 1992 rehearing was not technically an
original parole grant hearing, it was the first hearing at which
Monson's release date was determined. We have stated, MUntil
that initial term is set, any proceeding at which the issue is
considered must be perceived as a threat to the prisoner's
liberty," Neel, 886 P.2d at 1101, and we extended the benefit of
our decision in Neel v to those parole hearings at which an
inmate's release date is fixed or extended." Id.; see also Utah
Admin. Code R671-301-2 (1992) P i n rehearings, the offender is
afforded all the rights and considerations in the initial hearing
except as provided by other Board policies because the setting of
(Footnote continued on the next page.)
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failed to show how the "participation of counsel at the hearing
would have affected the accuracy of the information considered by
the Board." Neel, 886 P,2d at 1103. Such a showing is necessary
because our decision to extend particular procedural due process
requirements under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution
to certain parole hearings is grounded in the rationale that such
requirements will substantially further the accuracy and
reliability of the Board's fact-finding process. Id. Therefore,
if an inmate fails to demonstrate how a particular procedural
requirement will substantially further the Board's fact-finding
process/ we have no basis for concluding that a failure to
provide that procedure operated to deny the inmate due process.
Id. Here, Monson never asked the Board for the assistance of
counsel and has not even attempted to make the requisite showing
as to how counsel would have substantially assisted the factfinding process. Therefore, we cannot conclude that he was
denied due process because he lacked counsel at the 1992
rehearing.1*
For the same reason, we cannot conclude that Monson was
denied due process because he was unable to call witnesses on his
own behalf. He argues that because oral testimony is more
persuasive than written testimony, and because Kerby's relatives
were allowed to testify, he should have been able to offer the
oral testimony of witnesses favorable to him. Even if we were to
accept Monson's theory that oral testimony is more persuasive
than written testimony, which we do not on this record, Monson
has failed to show how the persuasive value of a particular
method of presenting witness testimony has anything to do with
substantially furthering the accuracy and reliability of the
Board's fact-finding process. In addition, we note that Board
regulations in effect at the time of the 1992 parole rehearing
provided, "An offender has the right to be present at a parole
grant, rehearing, rescission, or parole violation hearing [and]
may speak on his own behalf, present documents, ask, and answer
questions." Utah Admin. Code R671-301-2 (1992). From the

12

(Footnote continued.)
a parole date is still at issue."). Therefore, for purposes of
this appeal, we treat Monson's 1992 rehearing as a proceeding in
which due process guarantees apply.
13

Contrary to the implication of Justice Stewart's dissent,
we have not categorically rejected a claim for assistance of
counsel under the Utah Constitution's due process guarantees. We
have held only that in this case Monson has failed to show that
the denial of counsel met the standard of Neel. 886 P.2d at
1103.
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record/ it does not appear that Monson attempted to introduce any
documents containing witness testimony to further the Board's
fact-finding process; as a result, we have no basis for
concluding that he was denied due process simply because he was
not allowed the opportunity to present oral witness testimony.
Furthermore/ even if Monson had attempted to present such
documents and the Board had refused to admit them, Monson would
still have the burden of showing that such refusal was not only
error# but was harmful/ a burden which he has not met in this
case. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992).
Lastlyf we address Monson's claim that he was denied
due process because he did not receive a detailed written
explanation of the Board's parole decision following the 1992
rehearing.14 He claims that he was entitled to such an
explanation in accordance with the Board's rules and our decision
in Preece, in which we held that the Board must comply with its
own rules. Preece, 886 P.2d at 511-12. The Board's rule in
effect at the time of the rehearing required that an "explanation
of the reasons for [a] decision [be) given and supported in
writing." Utah Admin. Code R671-305-2 (1992) (current version at
Utah Admin. Code R671-305-1). Monson concedes that he received a
preprinted form on which the Board checked off its reasons for
its parole decision. The Board checked off five "aggravating"
factors related to Monson's crime and six "mitigating" factors
related to Monson's present characteristics. While perhaps not a
perfect explanation of the Board's rationale, this document
nonetheless satisfies the Board's own requirement that it provide
a written explanation of the reasons for its decision. Because
Monson has failed to identify with any particularity the type of
detail he claims he should have received and has failed to show
that such lack of detail was harmful to him, and because he
received a written explanation, we conclude that he was not
denied due process.
In summary/ we affirm the district court's dismissal of
Monson's claims in his petition for extraordinary relief, except
the claim that the Board failed to provide an explanation of its
decision to order restitution which takes into account the
statutory factors set forth in section 76-3-201 of the Code. As
to this claim, we remand for the entry of an order directing the
Board to comply with the proper statutory procedure.

14

We have already ruled that the Board erred in ordering
restitution without providing an adequate written explanation;
therefore, we read this claim as focusing on the adequacy of the
Board's rationale for its release date decision.
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Justice Russon concurs in Chief Justice Zimmerman's
opinion.
Justice Howe concurs in the result*

STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, dissenting:
I agree with the majority opinion except with respect
to one critical ruling: the right of an inmate to be represented
by counsel at the original release hearing, which in most cases
determines for practical matters the length of time a prisoner's
sentence will run. The majority holds that a prisoner has no
such right. I firmly believe that a prisoner does have such a
right.
In State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 {Utah 1982), we
stated, ^Sentencing is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding
at which a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel." Id. at 1007 (emphasis added); see also Mempa v. Rhay,
389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967). This Court has clearly recognized the
essential similarities between the judicial sentencing proceeding
and an original parole grant hearing before the Board of Pardons.
In Foote v. Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991), we
stated:
If the trial judge sends the defendant to
prison, the judge does not determine the
number of years the defendant will spend
there. That is left to the unfettered
discretion of the board of pardons, which
performs a function analogous to that of the
trial judge in jurisdictions that have a
determinate sentencing scheme.
In Labrum v. State Board of Pardons, 870 P*2d 902, 91011 (Utah 1993)/ we held that criminal parole grant hearings are
legally different from other parole proceedings, that the
original parole grant proceeding is essentially a sentencing
proceeding, and that the state due process clause applies
thereto. Although the issue presented in Labrum was not whether
one who had been convicted of a crime and sentenced by a court
was entitled to counsel in the original parole grant hearing, the
issue before the Court was the analogous issue of whether an
inmate was entitled to due process of law in an original parole
grant hearing. The Court stated/ *The reality of original
release hearings [i.e., original parole grant hearings] is that
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they are analogous to sentencing hearings and require due process
to the extent that the analogy holds." 16^ at 908,
A number of considerations strongly militate in favor
of recognizing the right of a prisoner to counsel in an original
parole grant hearing. One such factor is the necessity of
avoiding factual errors in the Parole Board's decisions. As
Justice Durham wrote in Labrum;
Justice Marshall of the United States
Supreme Court elaborated on the problem in
the parole context in his dissent in
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates/ 442
U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100# 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979):
In fact, researchers and courts
have discovered many substantial
inaccuracies in inmate files, and
evidence in the instant case revealed
similar errors. . • . In this case, for
example, the form notifying one inmate
that parole had been denied indicated
that the Board believed he should enlist
in a self-improvement program at th*
prison. But in fact, the inmate was
already participating in all such
programs available. . . . Such errors
in parole files are not unusual. E_,g.
Kohlman v. Norton, 380 F.Supp. 1073
(Conn. 1S74) (parole denied because file
erroneously indicated that applicant had
used gun in committing robbery); Leonard
v. Mississippi State Probation and
Parole Board, 373 F.Supp. 699 (ND Miss.
1974), rev'd, 509 F.2d 820 (CA5), c*rt
denied, 423 U.S. 998 [96 S.Ct. 4287^46
L.Ed.2d 373] (1975) (prisoner denied
parole on basis of illegal disciplinary
action); In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal.3d 639
[122 Cal.Rptr. 552], 537 P.2d 384 (1975)
(factually incorrect material in file
led parole officers to believe that
prisoner had violent tendencies and that
his "family reject[ed] him"); State y.
Pohlabel, 61 N.J.Super. 242, 160 A.2T"
647 (1960) (files erroneously showecj
that prisoner was under a life sentence
in another jurisdiction); Hearings on
H.R. 13118 et al. before Subcommittee
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No. 3 of the House Judiciary Committee/
92d Cong., 2d Sess.f pt. VII-A, p. 451
(1972) (testimony of Dr. Willard Gaylin:
"I have seen black jnen listed as white
and Harvard graduates listed with
borderline IQ's"); S. Singer & D.
Gottfredson, Development of Data Base
for Parole Decision-Making 2-5 (NCCD
Research Center, Supp. Report 1, 1973)
(information provided by FBI often lists
same charge six or seven times without
showing a final disposition).
Id. 442 U.S. at 33 & n. 15, 99 S. Ct. at
2117 & n, 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Labrum, 870 P.2d 909-10.
The Labrum opinion also refers to another factor that
weighs heavily in favor of recognizing a right of counsel at
original parole hearings:
Accuracy and fairness are essential in
proceedings which impinge as directly on
personal liberty as original parole grant
hearings.
The interests of both society and
criminal offenders are best served when
fairness and accuracy are assured at all
stages of the sentencing and
correctional process. An offender's
perception of fairness in the criminal
justice system is thought to promote
rehabilitation. Accurate sentencing and
parole decisions also further society's
interest in ensuring that offenders will
be returned to society neither sooner
nor later than is appropriate.
Finally, the criminal justice
system as a whole values and protects
accuracy and the appearance of fairness
....
For the approximately ninety
percent of all criminal defendants who
plead guilty, • . . sentencing and
parole represent the primary basis for
evaluating the fairness of the criminal
justice system.

No. 950199

22

Note, A Proposal to Ensure Accuracy in
Presentence Investigation Reports/ 91 Yale
L.J. 1225, 1241-42 (1982).
Labrum, 870 P.2d at 910.
The majority opinion incorrectly indicates that by
holding the due process clause of the Utah Constitution
applicable to initial parole determination hearings, "we
necessarily rejected the categorization of parole proceedings as
%
criminal proceedings' to which other constitutional rights,
including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal
prosecutions, might categorically attach." That is simply not;
in my view, correct. Of course, parole termination proceedings
are, according to a long line of cases, civil in nature. The
Court did, however, in Labrum, make quite clear th&t the original
parole grant hearing in which a "parole release date" is set is
"inherently a sentencing function." Id. at 911. Furthermore,
the Court's rejection of plaintiff's position in this case on the
ground that he had failed to show that the participation of
counsel at the hearing "would have affected the accuracy of the
information considered by the court" begs the essential question.
It is the appearance of counsel that enables a convicted person
to show inaccuracy or mistakes in the Board's sentencing
proceedings. The failure of this plaintiff, unaided by counsel,
to do so is hardly an argument for not recognizing his right to
such a fundamental aspect of a fair procedure.
In my view, an original parole grant hearing is part

and parcel

of the sentencing

procedure In this

state's

indeterminate sentencing scheme, and for that reason, plaintiff
is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of
counsel in those proceedings.
For that reason, I respectfully dissent.

Justice Durham concurs in Associate Chief Justice
Stewart's dissenting opinion.
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